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Executive Summary
At COP24 in December 2018, Parties adopted a large part of the so-called “rulebook” operationalizing 
the articles of the Paris Agreement and the accompanying decision 1/CP.21. Due to lack of consensus 
on several contentious topics surrounding accounting, integrity and ambition, the rules for the market 
mechanisms under Article 6 have been postponed to COP25. Even if the guidelines for transfers of 
international emission reduction credits in cooperative approaches (Article 6.2) and the rules, 
modalities and procedures for the UNFCCC-supervised crediting mechanism (Article 6.4) are adopted 
as planned at COP25, the full operationalization of these mechanisms is expected to take several 
years. In this context, the objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview of key design 
elements implemented in existing “baseline and credit” carbon crediting schemes and to draw lessons 
that can inform the negotiations on Article 6.  
In a first step, the paper identifies the most important carbon crediting schemes at different levels of 
governance and of different geographical focus for analysis and subsequently compares them along 
six main dimensions: Governance and accounting; scope and eligibility; environmental integrity; 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); sustainable development (SD) contributions; and linkages 
with other carbon pricing instruments. While international crediting schemes have suffered from a lack 
of demand since the early 2010s, domestic crediting schemes are spreading at national and 
subnational levels. At the international level, the study reviews key features of the international crediting 
schemes under the Kyoto Protocol, notably the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation 
and Green Investment Schemes for International Emissions Trading. As an example for bilaterally 
implemented schemes, the Joint Crediting Mechanism is included. At a (sub)national level, schemes 
from Australia, California, Canadian provinces, China, Spain and Switzerland were selected. Finally, 
the voluntary offset standards Gold Standard and Verra are discussed. The analysis is of common 
features and differences is completed by discussing alternative implementation approaches (see the 
Table below).  
Overview of key commonalities and differences among carbon crediting schemes 
Design 
elements 
Commonalities Differences Alternatives 
Governance 
and 
accounting 
- Most schemes have a
dedicated governance
body, e.g. the CDM EB,
supervising the activity
cycle
- Most schemes have a
dedicated GHG registry
- Schemes have different levels of
governance: international, national
and sub-national
- Schemes have different nature of
governance: public and private.
Mixed governance is not found.
- Common overarching
governance for centralized
mechanism and bilateral
cooperation
- Mixed governing body with
public and private actors
- Tendering of registry
operations to private actors
subject to specifications
Scope and 
eligibility 
- Most schemes allow for
both projects and PoAs
following the CDM
- Most schemes define
clear crediting periods
- Most schemes define
eligible host countries /
jurisdictions
- Most schemes have
some explicit project type
- Schemes differ in the length of
crediting periods, which may also be
differentiated by project type (from 5
to 100 years)
- Schemes differ in their geographical
eligibility (from global to national)
- Schemes differ in their negative lists
(e.g. nuclear, forestry, industrial
gases, etc.)
- Upscaled crediting
approaches for sector- and
economy-wide policy
instruments
- Aligning crediting periods with
NDC implementation cycles
- Restricting eligible activities to
sectors with particular NDC
characteristics (inside/outside;
conditional/unconditional)
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Design 
elements 
Commonalities Differences Alternatives 
exclusions (particularly 
nuclear) 
- There is an increasing 
trend to ban high-GWP 
industrial gases (HFC, 
N2O) 
- Existing schemes 
currently do not consider 
negative emissions 
technologies, such as 
biofuels with CCS  
- Restricting eligible activities to 
particularly sustainable 
technologies 
- Special access for LDCs and 
SIDS 
- Allowing for crediting of 
mitigation co-benefits of 
adaptation actions 
Environmental 
integrity 
- Most schemes set clear 
requirements in terms of 
MRV 
- Most schemes require 
some form of 
additionality 
demonstration  
- Most schemes address 
the double-counting 
issues through unique 
serial numbers of carbon 
credits 
- Some schemes define baselines 
project-by-project, some offer 
standardized baselines, some offer 
both 
- Approaches to additionality 
demonstration differ: project-by-
project with different levels of 
stringency and positive lists 
- Some schemes offer net mitigation 
through conservative baselines and 
limited crediting periods 
- Dynamic baseline approaches 
- Ambitious baseline setting in 
the context of NDCs 
- Requiring LEDS for long-term 
persistence of mitigation 
- Corresponding adjustments, 
also for voluntary standards 
- Discounting/automatic 
cancellation of credits for 
overall mitigation 
MRV - Methodologies are often 
developed in a bottom-up 
manner and accepted by 
a governing body 
- Monitoring approaches 
are typically defined in a 
methodology 
- Schemes differ with regards to 
reporting frequency and the 
requirement to make the reports 
public 
- Schemes vary in their approaches 
to verification: some do not require 
it, some are verified by a public 
entity, some by accredited auditors 
- Top-down methodology 
development/standardization 
- Verifier allocation by 
governing entity, common fee 
schedule 
- Allow for alternative metrics in 
ITMOs 
Sustainable 
development 
- Most schemes mention 
SD in their general 
principles but their 
implementation in 
practice varies greatly 
- Schemes differ in the level of 
emphasis which is put on SD in 
practice: some schemes mandate 
the demonstration of SD benefits 
- Some schemes offer concrete tools 
and metrics to measure SD 
contributions 
- Schemes differ in the way they 
provide safeguards against negative 
impacts and some do not have 
safeguards 
- Quantifying SD benefits for 
sale on voluntary markets 
Link with 
other policies 
- Most mechanisms are 
linked in some way with 
compliance or voluntary 
markets or other policies 
- Mechanisms vary in the way their 
carbon credits can be used: offsets 
in ETS, against carbon taxes and 
other policies, such as result-based 
finance 
- Linking of domestic carbon 
pricing instruments at the 
regional level through Article 
6.2 
Source: authors’ compilation 
When operationalizing the Article 6 mechanisms, negotiators should take into account the lessons 
these schemes offer, in particular with regard to contentious issues such as accounting, integrity and 
sustainable development (SD). Preventing lenient baselines and accounting ambiguities, as well as 
activities that jeopardize SD is key to ensure the mechanisms’ credibility and to prevent a repetition of 
the CDM’s “credibility crisis”. The required balance between demand and supply of credits is dependent 
on the linking of the crediting schemes to domestic mitigation policy instruments such as carbon pricing 
in the context of NDCs. In this regard, the stability and strength of the Article 6 mechanisms will depend 
on the willingness of the EU to revive its role as the international leader on crediting schemes in the 
post-2020 period, as well as the demand from other large players such as China and the US.   
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1. Introduction 
The Paris Agreement (PA) includes a new generation of international market mechanisms for climate 
change mitigation. Notably, Article 6 of the PA lays down the general framework for countries that wish 
to cooperate in achieving their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). In addition to non-market 
approaches (Article 6.8), Article 6 offers both a decentralized approach to enable Parties to transfer 
and use Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs, Article 6.2), and a new multilaterally 
governed crediting mechanism to support mitigation and sustainable development (Article 6.4).  
In December 2018, Parties to the United Nations Convention Framework on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) adopted a large part of the rules of the PA – often referred to as the “Paris rulebook” in 
Katowice with the transparency framework as the cornerstone. However, the operationalization of the 
provisions for the market mechanisms under Article 6 of the PA was postponed to COP25 in 2019 in 
Chile. Despite good progress in the first week of negotiations, key areas of contention on markets 
related to accounting, the transition of the Kyoto Mechanisms to Article 6 and the scope of the 
adaptation tax could not be resolved. Therefore, Article 6 is now the “glaring gap” of the Paris Rulebook, 
as its successful and robust operationalization is key to design a system that incentivizes higher 
ambition and private sector mitigation action. The contested status of the negotiation texts adds to the 
complexity of the situation. The last draft negotiation texts reflecting consensus are those elaborated 
in the first week under the Subsidiary Body for Technological and Scientific Advice (SBSTA). However, 
these texts combined include 450 brackets (SBSTA, 2018a-c). During the second week of negotiations, 
the Polish presidency conducted bilateral negotiations and published several iterations of a “Katowice 
text”. In its version of December 14th, this version still contains 131 brackets and no consensus could 
be reached by the end of the COP (COP Presidency, 2018b). A version of the Presidency text circulated 
on the final day of negotiations was later deleted from the UNFCCC website, which is highly unusual. 
In its decision, the CMA took note of both SBSTA and Katowice texts and decided that SBSTA should 
consider all versions in the continuation of the negotiations, while noting the lack of consensus on the 
Katowice text on Article 6 (UNFCCC, 2018a). Even if the rulebook on Article 6 can be adopted at 
COP25 in 2019 or early 2020, its full operationalization is expected to take several years. 
The new rulebook on international market mechanisms will also inform the work of the “Nordic Initiative 
for Cooperative Approaches” (NICA), established in 2018 to support implementation of the Paris 
Agreement and in particular operationalizing Article 6. Sweden, Norway, Finland and NEFCO are the 
current donors and NEFCO acts as the implementing Agency. The Project Group (PG) oversees NICA 
activities. This initiative builds on the recently completed Nordic Partnership Initiative on Upscaled 
Mitigation Actions, initiated in 2011 with a focus on technical assistance for the waste management 
sector in Peru.  
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In the context of this new phase, the present study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of key 
design elements implemented in existing carbon crediting schemes on various levels1. Besides 
informing the further elaboration of the NICA, the study seeks to inform negotiators regarding the range 
of options available for designing a crediting scheme and their key conceptual differences. This is of 
particular importance to define the relationship between the Article 6.2 rules, where credits generated 
under any baseline-and-crediting mechanism could be traded and the operationalization of the Article 
6.4 crediting mechanism under the UNFCCC supervision. The study is structured as follows: First, it 
identifies relevant existing carbon crediting schemes at international and (sub)national levels including 
public and private ones. Second, the study assesses the key design options chosen in these crediting 
schemes with regards to governance and accounting, scope and eligibility, achieving environmental 
integrity, monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), SD contributions and linkage to carbon pricing 
instruments. Third, the study outlines alternative implementation approaches for these design options 
that have not been implemented in any scheme yet but could be potentially relevant for Article 6. Finally, 
the key commonalities and differences among the existing schemes as well as relevant alternatives in 
terms of key design elements and/or their application are synthesized in a tabular format.  
2. Overview of existing carbon crediting schemes 
This section provides a brief overview on the main carbon crediting schemes that have been used since 
the 1990s on various levels, describing the purpose and scope of each scheme. 
2.1. Crediting schemes under the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) adopted in 1997 established the first generation of large-scale compliance 
carbon market mechanisms: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and 
International Emissions Trading (IET). 
Clean Development Mechanism  
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC, 2018c), defined in Article 12 of the KP, allows 
a country with a greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction or emission limitation commitment under 
the KP – Annex B Party – to acquire Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from emissions reduction 
projects in developing countries (non-Annex B Parties) and use them towards their commitment for 
compliance. To date, there has been more than 7800 registered projects and more than 300 
programmes in over 100 countries, with over 1.9 billion CERs issued (UNEP DTU, 2018a). The CDM 
has a dual goal of supporting Parties in fulfilling their Kyoto commitments and contributing to 
                                                     
1 The term “carbon crediting” is not used interchangeably with “carbon offsetting” in this report. “Carbon crediting” refers to the 
process of issuing a credit for one tCO2e that meets the criteria of the crediting scheme in question. Often, carbon credit schemes 
are called “baseline and credit” schemes”. “Carbon offsetting” refers to the use of carbon credits to compensate for an equivalent 
amount of emissions. 
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sustainable development (SD) in host countries, although the results regarding the latter objective have 
been mixed (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012a). Given the CDM’s large visibility, it has been assessed 
by a wide range of literature; evaluations have ranged from enthusiastic (e.g. Gillenwater and Seres 
2011) to scathing (e.g. Cames et al. 2016). Demand for CERs was mainly triggered by the 2004 
decision of the EU on the “linking directive” allowing the use of Kyoto credits by private sector 
companies for compliance under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (Shishlov 
and Bellassen, 2012a). The New Zealand and South Korean Emissions Trading Schemes followed, 
but subsequent to limitation of CER imports by the EU, only the Korean ETS continues to allow use of 
certain CER types. CERs can be used for in-kind payment of the Mexican carbon tax, and be submitted 
instead of paying the Colombian carbon tax. A similar approach is considered for the existing Chilean 
and planned South African carbon tax. Due to the overall reduction of demand, the supply of CERs 
exceeds the demand, which has resulted in very low (less than USD 1/tCO2eq) carbon prices since 
2013. Recently, CERs have been used as evidence for mitigation outcomes under results-based 
climate finance instruments; they have also been used in voluntary carbon markets. For that purpose, 
the UNFCCC Secretariat has set up a voluntary CER cancellation account in the CDM registry, in which 
more than 150 million CERs have been cancelled to date. 
Joint Implementation 
Joint Implementation (JI) (UNFCCC, 2018b), defined in Article 6 of the KP, allows an Annex B Party to 
buy emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission reduction or emission removal project in another 
Annex B Party. ERUs have to be converted from host Parties’ carbon budgets under the KP, i.e. 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). Unlike the CDM, the JI mechanism thus operates in a “capped 
environment” where host countries have their national emissions reduction commitments. 
Conceptually, JI is therefore similar to market mechanisms under the PA where all parties have 
emissions reduction commitments in their NDCs. 
There are two possible procedures, known as “JI Tracks” (Shishlov et al. 2012): 
• JI Track 1 allows the host Party to govern the “determination” (i.e. official registration) of JI 
activities, verification of emission reductions and issuance of ERUs without the international 
oversight of the UNFCCC. 
• JI Track 2 involves international oversight by the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee 
(JISC) and independent audit by UNFCCC-accredited third parties over the determination of 
JI activities and the verification of emission reductions. The host Party can only issue ERUs 
after the JISC has finalized the verification. 
Different countries approached JI differently depending on their Kyoto compliance position – i.e. surplus 
or deficit of AAUs. Notably, countries with ambitious emissions reduction commitments had an 
automatic incentive to ensure additionality and environmental integrity of carbon crediting while 
countries with “hot air”, i.e. large surplus AAUs, have treated additionality in a lenient way (Shishlov 
and Cochran, 2015). Given the current NDCs likely contain a material amount of “hot air”, i.e. NDC 
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objectives are above business-as-usual emissions (La Hoz Theuer et al. 2017), market mechanisms 
under the PA face a similar challenge as JI in Russia and Ukraine. Some countries used JI creatively 
as a domestic policy tool, e.g. to incentivize emissions reductions in the priority sectors or to incentivize 
the private sector to directly contribute to the achievement of the national targets by “capturing” part of 
the emissions reductions. Different strategies of using JI as a policy tool are illustrated by the examples 
of France, New Zealand and Ukraine (see Box below). 
Box 1: Different uses of JI depending on the host country 
JI host country New Zealand 
Before the start of the first Kyoto commitment period in 2008, New Zealand created a special framework – 
Projects to Reduce Emissions (PRE) – to encourage early offset projects that could later be included into the 
JI scheme (Shishlov et al. 2012). This framework included reverse auctioning for ERUs, i.e. project developers 
bid the number of ERUs for each t of mitigation achieved. This led to a differentiated level of discounting 
(Michaelowa and O’Brien, 2006). Under this scheme New Zealand conducted two tenders – in 2003 and 2004 
– which resulted in the registration of 34 projects with a total emissions reduction potential of around 10 
MtCO2eq (Ministry for the Environment of New Zealand, 2011). The example of New Zealand demonstrates 
how JI can be used as a domestic policy tool to incentivize emissions reduction projects in priority sectors. 
JI host country France 
In the beginning of the first Kyoto Commitment Period France’s compliance position was uncertain. The country 
therefore approached JI cautiously. In order not to “oversell” its emissions reductions, France applied a “90% 
rule” to all JI projects, whereby only 9 credits were issued for every 10 tCO2eq abated. Moreover, in some 
sectors with cheap abatement opportunities, such as N2O emissions reduction projects, France implemented 
conservative crediting baselines, resulting in carbon “under-crediting” of projects and allowing the government 
to “capture” part of emissions reductions for compliance, resulting in a cumulative discount of 41.6% until 2011 
and 60% in 2012 (Shishlov et al. 2012, Latvia and European Commission 2015). The example of France 
demonstrates how a host country can use JI to incentivize the private sector contribution to the achievement of 
national emissions reduction targets. In the context of the PA, countries with ambitious NDCs may adopt a 
similar approach where emissions reductions are “shared” between host and buyer country.  
JI host country Finland 
Finland also applied conservative crediting baselines in N2O emission reduction projects. The crediting 
threshold has been set to reflect a range of emission reductions feasible with the best available technology and 
taking into account domestic regulation. Emission reductions achieved by reaching the less ambitious end of 
the range were counted towards the host country. Only further emission reductions representing the more 
ambitious performance of best available technology were transferred to the buying country. This method to 
allocate credits between host and buyer country can provide an example for the allocation of credits between 
host and buyer country under Article 6. In Finland, three projects from 2009-2012 achieved 4.22 Mt of emission 
reductions of which 3.25 Mt were counted towards the host country and only 0.97 million ERUs were issued; 
i.e. a discount of 77% (Latvia and European Commission 2015).  
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JI host country Ukraine 
Unlike France, Ukraine had a large surplus of AAUs under the KP, often dubbed as “hot air”. This meant that 
the country – similar to other Eastern European countries – did not have to worry about “overselling” its 
emissions reductions. Contrary to France, Ukraine therefore applied the least conservative crediting baseline 
possible to its N2O emissions reduction projects (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012b). Overall, the large surplus of 
“hot air” resulted in serious concerns about the environmental integrity of certain types of JI projects in Ukraine 
and Russia (Kollmuss and Schneider, 2015). The example of Ukraine demonstrates that in the absence of 
ambitious national emissions reduction targets, countries may not have any incentive to ensure conservative 
crediting baselines. In the context of the PA, a similar risk arises in countries with NDC objectives above 
business-as-usual emissions. 
 
Green Investment Schemes for International Emissions Trading  
International Emissions Trading (IET) allows Annex I countries to directly trade their AAUs. The Green 
Investment Scheme (GIS) concept was introduced in order to tackle the hot air issue described above. 
The idea underlying the GIS can be described as “greening the hot air”. Under a GIS, the revenues 
obtained by a country from the sale of its AAUs must be invested in concrete domestic emission 
reduction activities. The GIS is therefore supposed to link the surplus AAUs trades to tangible emission 
reductions, although not necessarily preserving the ratio of one AAU per tCO2eq abated (Shishlov et al. 
2012). GIS have had various degrees of success, failing in Ukraine (Korppoo and Gassan-Zade 2014) 
while working well for certain energy efficiency technologies in the Czech Republic (Karásek and 
Pavlica 2016). Although not a crediting scheme per se, it is thus included in the analysis.  
2.2. Bilateral crediting schemes 
Joint Crediting Mechanism  
The Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) is a project-based bilateral crediting mechanism initiated by the 
Government of Japan from 2010 onwards. The JCM aims to facilitate the diffusion of leading low-
carbon technologies, products, systems, services, and infrastructure resulting in the mitigation of GHG 
emissions and contributing to the SD of developing countries (ADB, 2016). It was developed because 
the Japanese government was unhappy with the complex international rulebook of the CDM. JCM is 
based on bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between Japan and partner countries. 
Methodologies are specific to each of the bilateral cooperation “pairs”. It is not fully clear how JCM 
credits are counted towards the Japanese NDC2. However, the JCM aims to contribute to the host 
                                                     
2 The Japanese NDC says : The Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) is not included as a basis of the bottom-up calculation of 
Japan’s emission reduction target, but the amount of emission reductions and removals acquired by Japan under the JCM will 
be appropriately counted as Japan’s reduction.”[…] Japan establishes and implements the JCM in order both to appropriately 
evaluate contributions from Japan to GHG emission reductions or removals in a quantitative  manner […] and to use them to 
achieve Japan’s emission reduction target (GoJ, 2015). 
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Party NDC achievement through bilateral agreements on sharing and accounting for the mitigation 
outcomes and also through setting below business-as-usual (BAU) baselines and applying 
conservative default factors (GoJ, 2018).  
2.3. (Sub)national crediting schemes 
Domestic crediting schemes offset GHG emissions within the host country. Some domestic compliance 
markets, with a view to achieve domestic mitigation targets, are linked directly or indirectly to the 
international market, for instance, if they rely fully or partly on a multilateral standard such as the CDM. 
These schemes can also adopt voluntary carbon standards or develop their own protocols and 
principles. They have been mostly used in Anglo-Saxon countries, and are presented in alphabetical 
order of the implementing country/state below. 
Emissions Reduction Fund and Carbon Farming Initiative (Australia) 
Under the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF), created in 2014, Australia’s Clean Energy Regulator can 
purchase offsets from the land-use (the Carbon Farming Initiative, CFI) and industrial sectors. The 
Clean Energy Regulator sets a benchmark price for each auction; all bids up to 25% of the volume 
offered under the benchmark price are accepted. Project developers can apply for Australian Carbon 
Credit Units (ACCUs). The ERF operates as a competitive reverse auction mechanism, with 
confidential bids submitted to the Regulator, and accepted subject to clearing rules. The ERF was 
preceded by a carbon pricing mechanism established by the Clean Energy Act 2011, which was 
repealed on July 17, 2014 (PMR, 2015). This mechanism had in-built flexibility through the National 
Carbon Offset Standard of Australia (no longer active). 
Offset use for government operations (British Columbia) 
In 2010, British Columbia introduced a domestic offset scheme. The BC Carbon Registry enables the 
issuance, transfer and retirement of offset units that can be sold to government units that need to be 
carbon neutral, or to entities on the voluntary market.  
Compliance Offset Program (California)  
California’s emissions trading scheme caps the state’s largest sources of GHG emissions. Part of the 
compliance obligation can be met with California Air Resources Board (ARB) offset credits. Projects 
include those from sectors not covered under California’s ETS, such as livestock, mine methane 
capture, ozone depleting substances and forest. These can be generated through one of the standards 
approved by the ARB including the American Carbon Registry (ACR), Climate Action Reserve (CAR) 
and Verra (formerly Verified Carbon Standard, VCS). These standards are privately operated, and 
some of them are mainly used on the voluntary market. 
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Supplementary mechanism for national emissions trading (China) 
China operates seven provincial pilot ETS in preparation for the launch of a national ETS. These 
provincial schemes allow for the use of China Certified Emission Reductions (CCERs) to varying 
degrees. The majority of CCER issuance consists of emission reductions from CDM projects predating 
the registration date under the CDM. CCERs are validated and verified by the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC). Most methodologies for CCERs are based on the CDM, assessed 
for their frequency of use and applicability in China. In most pilot ETS CCERs can be used to offset 
emission allowances at a ratio 1:1, however there are limits for the use of offsets ranging from 1-10%. 
Some pilots limit CCERs by geographic source, mostly to their province. Furthermore, CCERs from 
large hydropower projects are not eligible in any pilot (Environomist 2017, Swartz 2017).  
Compliance and voluntary offset programmes (Ontario) 
Ontario developed two distinct carbon offsets programmes. One programme generates offset credits 
for compliance use in Ontario’s emissions trading scheme, while the other one is aimed for use by 
organizations and companies that want to voluntarily reduce their GHG emissions. Offset credits can 
only be generated in sectors not covered by the Ontario’s ETS. The compliance scheme has become 
obsolete after July 2018 when the ETS was abolished after a change in provincial government 
(Government of Ontario, 2018). 
Offset programme against ETS (Quebec) 
Québec’s Offset Program is a project-based offset mechanism under the Québec ETS. The programme 
considers sectors not covered by Quebec’s Cap-and-Trade Program including livestock manure 
management, landfill gas and ozone-depleting substances. Covered entities can use offset credits to 
fulfil up to of 8% of their compliance obligation. Credits are also eligible for use in California’s ETS 
(PMR, 2015). 
Carbon Fund for a Sustainable Economy offset acquisition (Spain)  
The Carbon Fund for a Sustainable Economy (FES-CO2) was created in 2011 to purchase carbon 
credits, including Verified Emissions Reductions (VERs) from projects implemented in Spain. While the 
activities under FES-CO2 will happen primarily at national level, the fund can also buy credits in the 
international carbon markets. It includes those sectors outside of the EU-ETS for the national territory 
while projects on energy efficiency (EE) and renewable energy (RE) were prioritized internationally. 
VERs of each project achieved during the first four years of the project are purchased by FES-CO2 at 
a fixed price. 
Domestic motor fuel emissions offset programme (Switzerland)  
Producers and importers of motor fuels can meet their mitigation obligations under the Swiss CO2 law 
using domestic offsets (PMR, 2015). The programme includes all sectors except for nuclear, Carbon 
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Capture and Storage (CCS), research & development activities, biofuels and fuel switch to natural gas 
in transport and building sector. Additionality regulations are rather strict. 
Climate Action Reserve (CAR) (US) 
The Climate Action Reserve is a private nonprofit organization that since 2008 has established 
standards for quantifying and verifying GHG emissions reduction from projects in the US, provides 
oversight to independent third-party verification bodies, and issues and tracks carbon credits over time 
on a transparent, publicly-accessible system. The CAR includes sectors and projects eligible under 
California’s offset programme in the US and landfill gas, livestock, nitrogen and organic waste projects 
in the US and Mexico. 
2.4. Voluntary crediting schemes/carbon standards  
Voluntary carbon offset standards were developed to complement the KP mechanisms. The demand 
on voluntary carbon markets has been primarily driven by corporate and individual social responsibility 
objectives. Overall, voluntary carbon market activities have generated 430 million tCO2eq of emission 
reductions since 2005, but prices have declined in the last years. In 2017, there has been an uptick in 
issuances (62.7 MtCO2e) and retirements (42.8 MtCO2e) of voluntary credits. This can be attributed to 
the adoption of the PA and new emission reduction commitments of the private sector. In general, 
however, volumes of credits issued and sold on the market are to a significant extent dependent on the 
developments on the compliance markets. When compliance markets are expected to emerge, 
businesses prepare by purchasing voluntary offsets. When compliance markets are in place, project 
developers and standards that previously operated in the voluntary market now shift their focus to 
compliance market activities and volumes of the voluntary market fall. Moreover, prices vary 
significantly on the voluntary market depending on buyer preferences such as strong SD co-benefits 
and the type of transaction. Typically, offsets that are bought in a bulk from large emission reduction 
projects are sold at lower prices than offsets from small-scale activities, often with a sustainable-
development and community focus (Hamrick and Gallant, 2018).  
The standard administrators have been valuable innovators, in particular with regards to simplification 
of MRV requirements, environmental integrity safeguards and SD co-benefits. In the last years, many 
voluntary standards work towards a holistic perspective on climate protection and the implementation 
of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development with its agreed 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).   
Gold Standard  
The Gold Standard is a foundation established in 2003 by WWF and other international NGOs that 
operates an offset standard focusing on environmental and social benefits. It can also be applied as 
an add-on quality label to CDM activities. Eligible sectors are RE, EE, waste, land use and forests 
(afforestation, reforestation and agriculture) and water (supply, purification and conservation) (Gold 
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Standard, 2018f). Under this standard, more than 550 registered projects have achieved emission 
reductions of about 78 million tCO2eq in the period 2008-2017 (Gold Standard 2018a). The foundation 
has launched a new generation of standards with the dual objective of pursuing climate action and the 
fulfilment of SDGs, Gold Standard for the Global Goals (GS4GG) in 2017 (Gold Standard, 2018g).  
Verra (VCS) 
Verra (formerly known as the VCS) is a not-for profit organization founded in 2005, serving as a 
secretariat to various standards (Verra, 2018g). Verra’s flagship is the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS). 
with CDM-like MRV requirements. It issues Verified Carbon Units (VCUs). In terms of volume, it is the 
largest voluntary standard in the world, having certified reductions of more than 200 million tCO2eq 
from more than 1300 projects since 2006 in a wide range of sectors3 (Verra, 2018f).  
Verra furthermore manages the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS), certifying 
land-based climate change projects that pursue multiple benefits: improve livelihoods, create 
employment, protect traditional cultures and endangered species, help secure tenure to lands and 
resources, increase the resiliency of ecosystems and help to combat climate change. CCBS 
certification can be applied also to VCS projects. So far, more than 100 projects covering more than 
10 million hectares of land have been validated, with 40 having achieved full verification (Verra, 2018e).  
American Carbon Registry (United States of America) 
The American Carbon Registry (ACR) was founded in 1996 as a nonprofit enterprise of Winrock 
International as the first private voluntary greenhouse gas registry in the world. The ACR is furthermore 
an approved offset project registry issuing Registry Offset Credits (ROCs) and early action offset 
program, issuing Early Action Offset Credits (EAOCs) for the California Cap-and-Trade program. Both 
offset types can be converted to ARB compliance offset credits. In the voluntary market, the ACR 
oversees the registration and independent verification of projects that meet ACR standards and 
methodologies.  
3. Key elements and principles of carbon crediting schemes 
This section provides an overview of key design elements and principles of carbon crediting schemes 
across six dimensions: governance and accounting, scope and eligibility, MRV, ensuring environmental 
integrity, ensuring SD and linkages with other carbon pricing instruments. 
                                                     
3 Sectors covered by the VCS: Energy (Renewable/Non-renewable); Energy Distribution; Energy Demand; Manufacturing 
Industries; Chemical Industries; Construction; Transport; Mining/Mineral Production; Metal Production; Fugitive Emissions from 
Fuels; Fugitive Emissions from Industrial Gases; Solvents Use; Waste Handling and Disposal; Agriculture Forestry and Other 
Land Use; Livestock and Manure Management. 
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3.1. Governance and accounting 
Governance can vary according to various dimensions, discussed below. 
Composition of the governance body 
On one side of the “centralized-decentralized” spectrum of governance, one can find the CDM and JI 
Track 2 that are overseen by UNFCCC bodies, notably the CDM Executive Board (EB) which consists 
of 10 members plus 10 alternates and the JISC, which are accountable to the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). International voluntary standards 
such as Verra and Gold Standard also feature centralized governing bodies that operate, however, 
outside the UNFCCC – the VCS Board and the Gold Standard Foundation Board respectively. Moving 
towards bi-national governance, in the JCM for each host country, a separate Joint Committee 
consisting of representatives from both participating governments is formed and acts as the executive 
body. This committee develops the rules, guidelines, methodologies, registers projects and oversees 
their implementation. Finally, domestic carbon crediting mechanisms naturally have national or sub-
national governing bodies. For example, under Switzerland’s domestic offset programme, the steering 
committee is composed of representatives from the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) and 
the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. In Quebec, the executive body is the Ministry of Sustainable 
Development, Environment and Climate Change which is responsible for project approval and 
registration, credit issuance and approving protocols. 
Public vs private 
Governing bodies can be public or private. Most compliance instruments, such as the UNFCCC 
mechanisms and national offset standards that issue credits eligible for compliance under carbon 
pricing policies are managed by a public governing body. Conversely, voluntary carbon crediting 
mechanisms are mostly managed by private entities, typically NGOs and foundations. For example, 
the Gold Standard is a private foundation with a foundation board of six members responsible for 
strategic governance (Gold Standard, 2018j). Verra is a not-for-profit organization, steered by a board 
of directors with representatives from the private or non-profit sector, working in a variety of working 
groups. Furthermore, private advisory committees have been set up for the development of specific 
standards and methodologies (Verra, 2018a). 
Validation procedures 
Carbon crediting mechanisms usually require validation of the project activities before their registration 
and the verification of emission reductions achieved by the project. Sometimes, however, validation 
and verification can be undertaken at the same time, for instance under the JCM or the voluntary 
standards Gold Standard and Verra. In most cases, such as the CDM, JI Track 2, JCM, the offset 
scheme of British Columbia and voluntary standards, validation is done by independent third party 
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entities. Under some subnational schemes, such as the Australian ERF, but also in Chinese ETS, 
validation is done by the executing government agency.  
Supervision of activity cycle 
Carbon crediting mechanisms typically include some degree of supervision of the three key phases of 
the activity cycle, notably, validation, MRV and credit issuance. Most compliance mechanisms, such 
as the CDM, are closely supervised along the activity cycle. The CDM EB is responsible for the final 
approval of registrations, credit issuance and baseline and monitoring methodologies. The largest 
voluntary standards provide a similar degree of oversight. For example, under the Gold Standard the 
secretariat manages the day-to-day issues and project certifications together with the NGO supporter 
network for advocacy and the third-party auditors responsible for validation and verification (Gold 
Standard, 2018j). 
Accounting and registries 
The issuance and transfers of carbon credits are typically accounted for in dedicated registries that 
allow to prevent double-counting. For example, under the CDM all CERs get issued to a central registry, 
with a serial number that allows tracking down the project and crediting year (“vintage”) to which they 
correspond. The CERs are first issued to the CDM EB’s pending account in the CDM registry, then 
forwarded to the respective holding accounts (minus 2% that go to the Adaptation Fund). They are 
finally transferred to a buyer’s account provided that there is a Letter of Approval (LoA) of a buyer 
country (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012a).  
Public offset programmes usually have public registries, but there are some hybrid approaches. The 
Californian programme requires the use of one of three private registry operators, one of them being 
the ACR. Offset credits from these registries must be converted into Californian offset credits before 
being eligible under the Cap-and-trade program. The regulatory body (Air Resources Board) approves 
eligibility of these projects after review of all documentation. If the review shows conformity with the 
regulation and applicable “Compliance Offset Protocol”, offset credits are issued after ARB receives 
confirmation that the credit owner has retired the corresponding registry offset credits (ARB 2018). 
Most private standards have their own registries. For example, Gold Standard projects are listed in 
public platforms recording the project documentation, managed by the private company IHS Markit4 to 
disclose project documentation and track related issuances, as well as transfer and retire credits. On 
this platform, different account holders display their ongoing projects, although (unlike the CDM) it is 
possible for account holders to decide not to disclose the information on projects and issuances 
                                                     
4 Markit environmental registry- public view: https://mer.markit.com/br-
reg/public/index.jsp?entity=project&sort=project_name&dir=ASC&start=0&entity_domain=Markit,GoldStandard  
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publicly. The Gold Standard foundation itself also hosts the “Water Benefit Standard Registry”5 
containing information on the registered projects and issuances of Water Benefit Certificates. The VCS 
registry system is a multi-registry system connected to one central project database. Currently, VCS 
registries are administered by APX and IHS Markit. Project developers must open an account with one 
of these two registry operators to apply for registration of projects and issuance of credits. The central 
project database serves as a platform to ensure no double counting is taking place (Verra, 2018h). The 
table below presents the key commonalities and differences in terms of governance. 
  
                                                     
5 Water Benefit Standard Registry: https://www.goldstandard.org/our-work/water-registry  
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Table 1: Comparison of carbon crediting mechanisms: Governance and Accounting 
Governance & 
Accounting 
Governance 
body 
Public vs 
private 
Validation 
procedure 
Supervision of activity 
cycle 
Accounting and registries 
ACR International Private Validation by 
accredited third 
party entities 
Winrock Board of 
Directors 
ACR of projects and credits 
issued 
AU CFI National Public Pre-registration 
assessment by 
the Clean 
Energy 
Regulator 
Australian Government; 
Clean Energy Regulator 
CFL Registry 
British Columbia Subnational Public Validation by 
accredited third 
party entities 
Ministry of Environment. The BC Carbon Registry 
California  Subnational Public Verification of 
eligibility of 
offsets by ARB-
accredited offset 
verification 
bodies 
California Air Resources 
Board 
Western Climate Initiative’s 
Compliance Instrument 
Tracking System Service 
(CITSS) 
CDM International Public Validation by 
DOE 
CDM EB CDM registry 
China National Public Verification of 
offset eligibility 
by NDRC 
NDRC National registry system 
with trading platforms in 
seven pilot provinces 
GIS Bilateral Public N/A N/A ITL (for AAU transactions) 
GS International Private Validation by 
accredited 
validation and 
verification body 
Gold Standard Foundation 
Board 
GS registry of projects and 
VER credits 
JCM Bilateral Public Validation by 
Third Party 
Entity 
Joint Committee with 
representatives from both 
governments 
JCM registry 
JI International Public Validation by 
independent 
entity 
JISC (Track 2) International transaction log 
(ITL) and national registries 
Ontario Subnational Public Validation of 
project activity 
by Director 
Ministry of Environment 
and climate change 
Compliance Instrument 
Tracking System Service 
(CITSS) 
Quebec Subnational Public Application for 
project 
registration is 
reviewed by the 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Ministry of Environment 
(MDE) 
Local Ministry of 
Environment registry 
Spain National and 
International 
Public Selection of 
project activity 
through OECC 
Consejo Rector and 
Comisión Ejecutiva, 
Climate Change Spanish 
Office (OECC) 
National registry 
Switzerland National Public Validation by 
accredited third 
parties 
Steering committee with 
members from FOEN and 
the Swiss Federal Office 
of energy. 
National registry 
US (CAR) International Private Eligibility check 
by the Reserve 
staff 
Board of Directors and 
Climate Action Reserve 
Staff 
CAR registry 
VCS International Private Validation by 
accredited 
validation and 
verification body 
VCS Board VCS registry system 
Source: authors’ compilation 
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3.2. Scope and eligibility 
Scope of activities 
Most crediting mechanisms are focused on individual emissions reduction or sequestration projects. In 
addition, the CDM, JI, Gold Standard and Verra also allow for Programmes of Activities (PoAs), a 
framework that allows implementing an unlimited number of usually small single component 
programme activities (CPAs) under one registered PoA. This framework aims at reducing the 
transaction costs – particularly for small-scale distributed emissions reduction activities, such as for 
example efficient cooking stoves or efficient lighting solutions, and large-scale renewable energy 
activities. Broader sectoral approaches or policy instruments have so far been ineligible under carbon 
crediting schemes, with the exception of attempts to pilot jurisdictional REDD+ activities. The GIS is 
one of the few examples that allows the use of proceeds from selling AAUs to finance sector-wide 
policies in host countries, although, as mentioned earlier, the GIS does not make an explicit link in 
terms of payments per tCO2eq abated. 
Temporal scope 
Most carbon crediting mechanisms set limits on crediting periods. For example, for CDM projects the 
crediting period can be either 10 years non-renewable or 7 years with the option to renew up to two 
times for a total maximum of 21 years; for forestry activities these periods are 30 years and 20 years 
renewable twice, respectively (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012a). The Gold Standard offers a five-year 
renewable certification cycle (Gold Standard, 2018r), while the VCS offers 10-year crediting periods, 
renewable up to two times for non-AFOLU projects (Verra, 2018f). Other standards also typically offer 
crediting periods between 5 and 10 years with a notable exception of forestry projects that may have 
significantly longer crediting periods, e.g. up to 100 years under the VCS and CAR.   
Geographical eligibility 
Carbon crediting mechanisms vary considerably in their geographical eligibility. For example, CDM 
projects may only be hosted by developing countries (non-Annex B Parties to the KP), while JI projects 
may only be hosted by industrialized countries (Annex B Parties to the KP). VCS is one of the few 
standards that has no geographical limitations. (Sub)national carbon crediting programs typically limit 
the geographical eligibility to the specific jurisdiction, e.g. Switzerland, California or Québec. 
Sectoral eligibility 
The CDM accepts all projects except nuclear facilities and limits forestry projects to afforestation and 
reforestation. Under JI there is no limitation on forestry projects and there are examples of JI forest 
management projects, e.g. in Russia. The VCS allows all project types except for nuclear facilities and 
recently excluded HFC-23 reduction. The JCM allows anything, Gold Standard explicitly excludes 
project types associated with geo-engineering or energy generated from fossil fuels or nuclear, fossil 
fuel switch or any project enhancing or prolonging such energy generation. An exception is made for 
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some energy efficiency programs involving fossil fuels, such as LPG stoves (Gold Standard, 2018d). 
New project types can be submitted to the Gold Standard for eligibility inclusion. The foundation will 
then establish new requirements, if needed with expert peer reviewers at the project developer’s 
expense (Gold Standard, 2018d). An interesting example is California’s Offset Program where carbon 
credits may only come from sectors not covered under California’s ETS, for example, livestock 
management, mine methane capture, ozone depleting substances and urban forest. Reasons for 
limitation are diverse, ranging from low cost of mitigation (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2014) to perceived 
risks for SD. The table below presents the key commonalities and differences in terms of scope and 
eligibility. 
Table 2: Comparison of carbon crediting mechanisms: Scope and Eligibility 
Scope & 
Eligibility 
Scope of 
activities 
Temporal scope (crediting period 
duration) 
Geographical 
eligibility 
Sectoral eligibility 
ACR Projects The standard crediting period is 10 
years, except for AFOLU projects, 
renewal is possible 
Worldwide, 
some sectors 
only United 
States 
Fuel combustion, industrial 
processes, land use, land 
use change and forestry, 
carbon capture and storage, 
livestock, waste handling 
and disposal 
AU CFI Projects The standard crediting period is 7 
years, for reforestation and 
revegetation projects 15-years, for 
native forest protection projects 20 
years. 
Australia Land and waste sector (CFI), 
the ERF is expanding the 
scope across the economy. 
BC Projects The crediting period may be up to 25 
years for sequestration projects and 
up to 10 years for other project types 
British Columbia All sectors, as long as it 
drives clean economic 
opportunities while cutting 
emissions 
California  Projects Non-sequestration 7 - 10 years, 
unless specified otherwise. 
Sequestration 10 - 30 years 
California and 
Quebec 
Sectors not covered under 
California’s ETS 
CDM Projects and 
PoAs 
7 years (20 years forestry) 
renewable up to 2 times or 10 years 
(30 years forestry) non-renewable 
Developing 
countries (KP 
non-Annex B) 
All except nuclear, some 
limits on forestry projects 
(only A/R allowed) 
China Projects Same as CDM. Most schemes only 
allow for credits issued after 2013 
Seven piloting 
regions allowing 
use of CCER. 
Most pilots 
restrict eligible 
credits to credits 
issued in the 
region 
Varying between the seven 
piloting regions allowing use 
of CCER. Regulation allows 
trading activities of GHG 
emissions from CO2, CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF. 
All pilots exclude credits 
from large hydropower 
projects 
GIS Any Not defined Developed 
countries (KP 
Annex B) 
No explicit exclusions 
GS Projects and 
PoAs 
Same as CDM. Global RE; EE; Industrial Waste 
handling and LULUCF 
JCM Projects The crediting period for a JCM 
project is determined by the project 
lifetime 
International 
JCM partner 
countries 
No explicit exclusions 
JI Projects and 
PoAs 
5 years (2008-2012) Developed 
countries (KP 
Annex B) 
All except nuclear 
Ontario Projects Defined in each specific 
methodology, but up to 30 years for 
GHG sequestration initiatives and up 
to 10 years for non-sequestration 
initiatives. 
Ontario Sectors not covered under 
Ontario’s ETS 
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Scope & 
Eligibility 
Scope of 
activities 
Temporal scope (crediting period 
duration) 
Geographical 
eligibility 
Sectoral eligibility 
Quebec Projects 10 years for manure and landfill 
projects. 5 years for ODS projects. 
Quebec and 
California 
Sectors not covered under 
Quebec’s ETS 
Spain Projects Up to 7 years Mainly Spain, 
but open to 
international 
credits. 
For the National Territory 
(sectors outside the EU-
ETS). For International 
Territory EE, RE and waste 
management projects will be 
prioritized 
Switzerland Projects and 
PoAs 
7 years (renewable for 3 years at a 
time after re-validation during the 
project life time) 
Switzerland All except for nuclear; CCS; 
R&D activities; Biofuels; Fuel 
switch to natural gas in 
transport and building sector 
US (CAR) Projects Defined in each methodology. In 
general: 2 times 10 years for non-
AFOLU projects. For AFOLU 
projects, crediting period may be 5 
yrs x 3 (agriculture) and up to 100 
yrs (forestry) 
U.S. and Mexico Sectors and Projects eligible 
under California’s OP + 
Landfill gas, Livestock, 
Nitrogen and Organic waste 
in the US and Mexico 
VCS Projects and 
PoAs 
Two times 10 years for non-AFOLU 
projects, 20-100 years for AFOLU 
projects, with renewal of baseline 
every 10 years. 
Global All CDM sectoral scopes 
Source: authors’ compilation 
3.3. Environmental integrity 
Environmental integrity means that global GHG emissions must not increase because of the use of 
crediting mechanisms (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2016). Most mechanisms explicitly or implicitly require 
that environmental integrity is ensured. For example, the CDM requires that emissions reductions are 
“real, measurable and additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity”. 
In addition, the CDM requires emissions reductions to be permanent, while crediting is only allowed 
ex-post, i.e. only after they are realized (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012a). Several key concepts related 
to environmental integrity are discussed in this section: baseline setting, additionality, permanence of 
emissions reductions, avoidance of double counting and contribution to overall mitigation. 
Baseline setting 
Baseline usually refers to a scenario that reasonably represents anthropogenic GHG emissions that 
would most likely have occurred in the absence of the project. There are different approaches in setting 
baseline emissions, mainly between standardized and project-based baselines, with all offset 
programmes using standardized approaches to some extent. For example, the CDM’s rules on baseline 
setting are determined project-by-project, although standardized approaches exist for some project 
types. Project participants may select an approved standardized baseline that is applicable to the 
proposed CDM activity. Switzerland’s domestic offset programme, JI and the JCM follow similar 
approaches where the baseline is determined on a project-by-project basis. On the other hand, 
programmes such as California’s offset programme, CAR and Quebec use protocols that incorporate 
standardized baselines set in line with regulations and common practice. In order to enhance 
environmental integrity, baselines also have to be determined based on the principle of 
conservativeness. This means that in case of inconclusive data, assumptions need to be taken that 
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ensure that calculated emissions reductions may be lower than the actual values in order to prevent 
over-crediting. 
Additionality  
Additionality ensures that only those projects that would not have happened anyway should be eligible 
to receive carbon credits. Similar to setting baseline emissions, determining additionality under carbon 
crediting schemes requires to consider the respective country’s circumstances. In practice, there are 
several ways to assess additionality (Schneider et al., 2017): 
 Investment analysis: demonstration that an activity is not economically viable without crediting 
(investment comparison analysis, benchmark analysis, simple cost analysis); 
 Barrier analysis: demonstration that an economically attractive activity faces prohibitive barriers 
of some other kind; 
 Positive lists, negative lists, eligibility criteria and decision trees: delimitation of what type of 
activities are likely to be additional or non-additional. 
The NEFCO Norwegian Carbon Procurement Facility (NorCaP) - established in 2013 - assesses the 
“vulnerability” of specific CDM projects, i.e. their risk of discontinuation, based on the regulatory and 
contractual context, and the dependency on carbon revenues (Sharma 2015). Warnecke et al. (2017) 
conducted a vulnerability assessment at the project type level in the CDM portfolio. They identified 
vulnerable project types that should be supported with priority in the context of results-based climate 
finance or climate policy instruments in the period of pre-2020. 
Building on CDM standards, the Gold Standard proves financial additionality by either UNFCCC- or 
Gold Standard-approved tools (Gold Standard, 2018c). Some offset programmes determine a list of 
project types ex-ante that are automatically deemed additional, such as the AU CFI where to be eligible, 
activities must be on the positive list. To be on the positive list, activities must be assessed to be 
additional, with requirements including that the project must go beyond common practice and must not 
be required by another law. Verra is testing standardized additionality tests applied on the basis of 
performance indicators (exceeding a performance benchmark set for a certain type of project) or on 
the basis of an activity method defined per project type (e.g. positive list of technologies per project 
type) (Verra, 2017b). The California Air Resources Board (2013) checks the rules of eligible offset 
protocols according to their ability to show that an activity is not common practice and that it goes 
beyond current regulation.  
Permanence of emissions reductions 
Emissions reductions have to be permanent, which may not be the case for some forestry and land 
use projects due to the risk of reversing emissions reductions, e.g. if there is a forest fire. This is why 
under the CDM; reforestation projects may only issue temporary CERs – tCERs – or long-term CERs 
– lCER. VCS, by contrast, uses a “buffer” which sets aside a certain percentage of issued credits on 
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which can be drawn in case some emission reductions are reversed. California’s Offset Program 
ensures the permanence of emissions and manages risks of reversal or potential double counting with 
the provision that credits generated under the program can be invalidated for up to eight years after 
the end of the reporting period (or after issuance of the credit). 
Avoiding double counting 
Double counting is an umbrella term commonly used to describe situations in which a) the same 
emission reduction leads to issuance of more than one unit (double issuance), b) the same emission 
reduction is counted by the buyer country and at the same time by the seller country (double claiming), 
or c) the same unit is used twice (double use) (Schneider and La Hoz Theuer, 2018). To manage 
double counting risks, the Gold Standard has identified a list of countries that could pose a risk of 
double counting including: KP Annex B countries, countries having international commitments that 
trade emission permits with other countries, and any country, region or locality that has a domestic 
level emissions trading scheme or carbon tax in place (Gold Standard, 2015). For programmes on a 
national level, double counting risks are typically lower, as there is more control of the emissions 
reduction calculations and overall volume of carbon credits. For example, entities covered by the 
California ETS or by the Québec ETS may use offsets to cover up to 8% of their compliance obligation 
under the ETS. To avoid double counting, no offset can be issued in sectors covered under the ETS 
or in those that fall into specific regulation (e.g., landfills in California). Beyond that, to manage risks of 
reversal or potential double counting, Californian offsets can be invalidated ex post as described above. 
International schemes such as the CDM typically address the double-counting issue through a 
dedicated registry, in which each carbon credit has a unique serial number and can only be held in 
individual accounts. Similar to this mechanism, CAR climate reserve tonnes (CRTs) are tracked in 
CAR’s registry where units have individual serial numbers.  
Contribution to overall mitigation 
The term “overall mitigation in global emissions” was first introduced in the PA, although similar 
concepts were previously discussed in the context of the review of the CDM and JI under the KP and 
as part of the conceptualization of new market mechanisms. While the existing carbon crediting 
mechanisms are not explicitly targeting “net mitigation”, overall emissions reductions have likely 
occurred due to conservative baselines, limited crediting periods and the use of results-based climate 
finance to cancel units. For example, the revised CDM methodologies for HFC-23 projects allowed for 
crediting of only part of emissions reductions, effectively resulting in “net” emissions reductions. 
Similarly, the JCM is using crediting thresholds that are more ambitious than BAU, and therefore also 
achieves a net mitigation impact. However, it should be noted that in the context of the PA, where all 
countries have emissions reductions commitments, changing baselines will only affect the distribution 
of emissions reductions between the buyer and the seller country rather than the level of mitigation.  
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Table 3: Comparison of carbon crediting mechanisms: Environmental integrity 
Environmental 
integrity 
Baseline setting Additionality Double counting Overall mitigation 
ACR Project-to-project 
basis 
Additionality test against 
a performance standard 
or three-prong test 
(regulatory context, 
common practice, 
implementation barriers) 
Unique serial number 
within the region and 
annual attestation of 
ownership 
Through conservative 
baselines 
AU CFI Mostly 
standardized 
baselines 
Additionality test Unique serial number Standardized baselines 
build on conservative 
protocols. 
BC Not specified Established in the 
greenhouse gas industrial 
reporting and control act. 
Not specified Not specified 
California OP Mostly 
standardized 
baselines 
Additional to regulation 
and not common practice 
Offset credits are traded 
and tracked in the CITSS 
Standardized baselines 
build on conservative 
protocols 
CDM and JI 
Track 2 
Mostly project-to-
project basis 
Usually determined 
project-by-project / some 
positive lists 
Unique serial number Through conservative 
baselines and limited 
crediting periods 
China Based on CDM, 
but going beyond 
Based on CDM Unique serial number, 
tracked in national registry 
Conservativeness is a 
requirement when 
establishing baselines 
and standardization 
GIS N/A Some additionality 
requirements, e.g. in the 
EU member states 
N/A N/A 
GS Mostly project-to-
project basis 
Usually determined 
project-by-project /relies 
on UNFCCC rules 
Unique serial number Conservativeness is 
stated as one of the 
fundamental principles 
of the GS 
JCM Project-to-project 
basis 
Additionality 
determination is 
substituted by eligibility 
criteria for each of the 
methodologies, similar to 
a positive list 
Double counting is 
excluded: “neither side 
uses any mitigation 
projects registered under 
the JCM for the purpose of 
any other international 
climate mitigation 
mechanisms” 
Crediting thresholds that 
are more ambitious than 
BAU 
JI Track 1 Mostly project-by-
project basis 
Set by the host Party and 
determined on a project-
by-project basis 
Unique serial number Varies by requirements 
set by the host party 
Ontario Mostly 
standardized 
baselines 
Offset credits can only be 
generated in sectors not 
covered by the Ontario’s 
Cap-and-Trade Program 
Positive verification 
statement 
Standardized baselines 
build on conservative 
protocols. 
Quebec Mostly 
standardized 
baselines 
Offset credits can only be 
generated in sectors not 
covered by the Quebec 
Cap-and-Trade Program 
Declaration of not double 
counting 
Standardized baselines 
build on conservative 
protocols. 
Spain Not specified Must be additional to 
current climate legislation. 
Not specified Not specified 
Switzerland Mostly project-to-
project basis 
Usually determined 
project-by-project 
Restricted national buyers Conservativeness as a 
requirement when 
establishing baselines 
US (CAR) Mostly 
standardized 
baselines 
GHG reductions must be 
additional 
Unique serial number Mention of conservative 
assumptions, values 
and procedures to avoid 
overestimation 
VCS Mostly project-to-
project basis 
Usually determined 
project-by-project 
Secure registry system Use of conservative 
assumptions, values 
and procedures to 
ensure that net GHG 
emission reductions are 
not overestimated 
Source: authors’ compilation 
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3.4. Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
MRV structures aim at ensuring transparency and ensuring that the number of carbon credits 
corresponds to actual GHG emissions reductions6.  
Methodologies 
The CDM and JI use a bottom-up process to develop baseline and monitoring methodologies. 
Methodologies are typically developed by individual project participants and consultants that propose 
methodological approaches specific to their project that are then evaluated and approved by the 
UNFCCC. The CDM has thus so far generated over 200 methodologies, and these have been used as 
the basis for the majority of methodologies of other carbon crediting programmes, being directly used 
(JI, GS, VCS) or modified to fit requirements (CAR, CCER, GS, VCS, Switzerland). VCS accepts CDM 
and CAR methodologies but also develops new methodologies involving public consultations and two 
reviews by external validation/verification bodies (Verra, 2018b). 
Monitoring 
Monitoring stands for the collection of the data through direct measurement or the use of proxies, 
necessary for calculating the emission reductions within a given scope and timeframe (Shishlov, 2015). 
In the CDM, the monitoring plan to identify and regularly measure (or estimate) anthropogenic GHG 
emissions from sources within the project boundaries has to be implemented in accordance with 
methodologies, guidance documents and standards provided by the CDM EB. For California and 
Switzerland their monitoring requirements are linked to their local jurisdictions The former specified 
them in the local cap-and-trade regulation and compliance offset protocols, while in the latter the 
monitoring approach is developed by the project owner and approved by the government agency. The 
Gold Standard has innovated by not only monitoring GHG reductions but also positive SDG impacts, 
stakeholder engagement and climate-related monitoring parameters (Gold Standard, 2018c). 
Reporting 
Reporting includes the aggregation, recording and communication of this data to the relevant 
authorities (Shishlov, 2015). For any programme several reporting periods will be contained in the 
crediting period of a project. The duration of monitoring periods in the CDM, i.e. the frequency of 
submission of monitoring reports, is not predefined and larger projects usually submit monitoring 
reports more frequently. In the case of Australia’s Emission Reduction Fund and CFI, participants have 
to complete and submit project reports to the Clean Energy Regulator at the end of each reporting 
6 The overall approach to transparency of crediting mechanisms is of great importance, but resources did not allow for any 
deeper analysis in this assignment. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to MRV-specific elements of crediting schemes.
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period. The first reporting period begins at the start of a project’s crediting period and subsequent 
reporting periods begin immediately after the end of the previous reporting period. The reporting 
periods under the CFI vary between six months to five years. Credits can only be issued to a project 
once a report is received and assessed (Clean Energy Regulator, 2016). In British Columbia, project 
proponents must report on emission reductions or removals on a yearly basis. 
Verification 
Verification is aimed at detecting errors and/or fraudulent reporting and is usually conducted by an 
independent third party (Shishlov, 2015). Most carbon crediting mechanisms require some form of 
verification by an independent third party, which usually has to be accredited by the governing body. 
For example, under the CDM the consistency between the project description and the relevant 
methodology to calculate emissions reductions, the monitoring plan, and the correct implementation of 
the project have to be periodically verified by an independent UNFCCC-accredited auditor (Shishlov 
and Bellassen, 2012a). In the case of California’s Offset Program each report must be verified by an 
ARB-accredited verification body before compliance offsets are issued. Some voluntary standards, 
such as, for example, VCS automatically allow auditors that have been accredited by the UNFCCC. 
Some schemes, such as for instance GIS, do not require any verification. Some programmes, such as 
VCS and GS allow for simultaneous validation of a project and verification of emissions reductions. 
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Table 4: Comparison of carbon crediting mechanisms: MRV 
MRV Methodologies Monitoring Reporting Verification 
ACR CDM-based and new 
methodologies bottom-up 
and top down 
Defined in approved 
methodologies 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
Third party verification 
by ACR-approved 
validation and 
verification bodies 
AU CFI Both bottom and up-top 
down. Assessed by the 
Domestic Offsets Integrity 
Committee 
Rules defined in 
approved 
methodology 
Monitoring reporting 
between 0.5 to 5 years 
depending on the project 
type 
Mandatory audit 
report, by registered 
GHG energy auditor 
Conducted by the 
Clean Energy 
Regulator 
BC Adapted from existing 
regulated and voluntary 
offset markets 
Defined in each 
methodology 
(template is provided) 
Annual monitoring report. Independent 
validators and 
verifiers. Ministry of 
Environment 
California 
OP 
CDM-based and new 
methodologies 
Defined in ETS 
regulation and 
Compliance Offset 
Protocols 
Mandatory offset project 
data report 
ARB accredited 
verification bodies 
CDM Mostly bottom up/ project 
by project 
Defined in CDM 
methodologies 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
Third-party verification 
done by DOE 
China CDM-based and new 
methodologies 
Defined in each 
methodology. Rules 
defined by the NDRC 
Mandatory public reporting Third party 
verification/ NDRC 
GIS N/A N/A N/A None 
GS CDM, CDM-based and 
new methodologies 
For GHG uses 
UNFCCC standards. 
Sustainability defined 
in GS Project Passport 
Monitoring report 
(including GHG and 
sustainability aspects) 
DOE and GS 
Secretariat  
JCM CDM-based and new 
methodologies, project by 
project 
Defined in each 
methodology 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
Third Party Entity 
/Joint Committee 
JI Mostly bottom up/ project 
by project 
Requirements set by 
host Party 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
Third-party verification 
by AIE 
Ontario Adapted from existing 
regulated and voluntary 
offset markets 
Defined in each 
methodology 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
Ministry of 
Environment and 
climate change. 
Quebec Developed by the 
government of Quebec. 
CDM-based and new 
methodologies 
Defined in each 
methodology 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
Accredited 
Verification Body 
/MDE staff 
Spain CDM-based and new 
methodologies 
Defined in each 
methodology 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
Consejo Rector FES-
CO2  
Switzerland CDM-based and new 
methodologies 
Defined in 
standardized 
methodologies (CDM) 
/ guidance by the 
governmental agency 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
DOE / Governmental 
agency. 
US (CAR) Top-down, and CDM 
based. 
Defined in each 
methodology. 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
Accredited 
Verification Body / 
Climate Action 
Reserve Staff 
VCS CDM, CDM-based, new 
methodologies and CAR 
(except for forest 
protocols) 
Defined in each 
methodology 
Monitoring reports, no 
specified frequency 
VCS approved auditor 
and staff 
Source: authors’ compilation 
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3.5. Sustainable Development contributions 
Most carbon crediting schemes require explicitly or implicitly that projects contribute to SD objectives 
in their local jurisdiction, but the importance that they give to this topic varies significantly.  
Sustainable development as an explicit objective 
The CDM, JI, AU CFI, JCM, CAR, VCS and GS mention the contribution to SD in their principles and 
in some of the projects under the respective schemes. The CDM establishes SD as one of the two 
main objectives of the mechanism. Voluntary standards have been explicit in their commitment to SD. 
The Gold Standard states to be a standard for “the global goals” with the objective to develop a “next 
generation of standards to quantify, certify and maximize impact toward climate security and 
sustainable development”, thereby setting the dual goal of achieving the Paris Agreement and the 
SDGs (Gold Standard, 2018i). GS has also established that any projects or programmes seeking 
validation must demonstrate their contribution to at least three SDGs, including SDG13 on climate 
action (Gold Standard, 2018c). Under the JCM, information on SD impacts, an environmental impact 
assessment and local stakeholder consultations are required in the project design documents. A 
national scheme that also mentions the use of the SDGs is Ontario’s carbon offsets programme stating 
that it will utilize the SDGs to facilitate identification of co-benefits in project development. 
Sustainable development evaluation metrics and tools 
The assessment of the SD contribution in the CDM is a responsibility of a host country’s Designated 
National Authority that has to confirm this contribution in its letter of approval, without which a project 
cannot be registered. This reflects the sovereignty principle which affirms that host countries are 
independent in prioritizing their own development needs (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012a). There is 
therefore no mandatory requirement or metric to assess the SD contribution. The CDM EB sought to 
address this issue by developing a tool to streamline SD-reporting, although this was only published in 
2014 and has not been used widely. This tool could potentially serve as a starting point to develop 
rules and procedures for SD assessment under Article 6.4 of the PA. It is voluntary and can be used 
at any time in the lifetime of a CDM project. Co-benefits of the three main dimensions of SD 
(environmental, social and economic) re reported using 70 different indicators. From the data gathered 
in the tool, a SD Co-benefit (SDC) report is generated and made public on the CDM website (UNFCCC, 
2015). Some countries, such as Uganda and Cambodia, use these SDC reports as a basis for local 
stakeholder consultations and for issuing the Letter of Approval. Most countries, however, have no 
specific SD criteria among their CDM project requirements.  
The GS posits that project developers have three options to demonstrate SD-impacts: (1) select and 
monitor against internationally adopted UN SDG targets and indicators; (2) follow a GS approved SDG 
tool or (3) follow a GS approved methodology (Gold Standard, 2018r). It offers SDG impact 
methodologies under its GS4GG, with more specific tools for SDGs 13 (climate action), 7 (affordable 
and clean energy), 6 (clean water and sanitation), 5 (gender equality), and 3 (good health and well-
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being) (Gold Standard b). Verra is currently developing the Sustainable Development Verified Impact 
Standard (SD VISta)7 as framework to assess and report upon the SD co-benefits of project-based 
activities (Verra, 2018d). The standard is planned to be released in January 2019 (Verra, 2018c).  
Safeguards against negative impacts 
There are different types of safeguards against negative impacts. One of the most common 
mechanisms is the application of a “negative list” of projects that might cause adverse outcomes for 
the environment or the community. For example, the CDM excludes nuclear projects, while Australia’s 
CFI excludes establishment of vegetation on illegally or recently cleared land, and establishment of 
vegetation on illegally or recently drained wetlands. Generally, voluntary standards have been leading 
the establishment of safeguards, also expanding the scope of what is considered a SD impact. The GS 
social, economic, environmental and ecological safeguard principles have been enhanced by two SDG-
related safeguards: a gender related safeguard meaning that the equal opportunity for men and women 
to participate in the project must be central to the design of any project as well as a water related 
safeguard, to ensure water accesses is not reduced or endangered (Gold Standard, 2018h).  
Overall, the GS Safeguards are conceptualized to ensure the respect of principles related to:  
• Social safeguards: Human rights; Gender equality and women’s rights; Community health, 
safety and working conditions; Cultural heritage, indigenous peoples, displacement and 
resettlement; Corruption; Economic impacts (equitable and sustainable growth, worker’s 
rights) 
• Environmental and ecological safeguards: Climate and Energy (not increase emissions, not 
restrict local energy access); Water (impacts on natural water patterns/flows, erosion or water 
body instability); Environment, ecology and land-use (landscape modification and soil, 
vulnerability to natural disasters, genetic resources, release of pollutants, hazardous and non-
hazardous waste, pesticides and fertilizers, harvesting of forests, food, animals, conservation 
of value areas and critical habitats, endangered species) (Gold Standard, 2018e) 
CCBS is aligned with the UNFCCC REDD+ safeguards, addressing transparency, participation of 
stakeholders, protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services, and respect for rights of indigenous 
and local communities (Verra, 2017a). 
Another way of addressing potential negative impacts is a stakeholder complaints mechanisms. Such 
a mechanism exists under the Gold Standard and VCS. It was also proposed under the CDM reform, 
but never implemented. 
                                                     
7 Project developers will assess benefits of the project across two dimensions “People and their prosperity” and “Planet”. Projects 
will have to demonstrate positive impact on at least one SDG covering one of the two dimensions (Verra 2018t). 
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Table 5: Comparison of carbon crediting mechanisms: Sustainable Development 
Sustainable 
Development 
Sustainable 
Development/SDGs 
SD Requirements Safeguards against 
negative impacts 
ACR Projects may disclose positive 
contributions to SDGs, but no 
particular tool or protocol 
No requirement, but ACR can be 
combined with the Climate 
Community and Biodiversity 
Alliance (CCBA) Standard 
Impact assessment to 
ensure compliance with 
environmental and 
community safeguards best 
practices.  
AU CFI No specific sustainability 
objective 
Decided by the Domestic Offsets 
Integrity Committee and the Minister 
Negative list against 
projects that might cause 
adverse outcomes 
BC Mentions the programme as part 
of their sustainability targets  
No specific sustainability 
requirement 
Not mentioned 
California OP No specific sustainability 
objective 
No specific sustainability 
requirement 
Analysis on potential harm 
under the California 
Environmental Quality Act. 
CDM Stated as one of the two main 
objectives of the mechanism 
No UNFCCC rules, requirements 
established by host country 
Not mentioned 
China Contribution to SD is an 
approval criterion 
N/A Not mentioned 
GIS N/A N/A Not mentioned 
GS Sustainability is a core 
requirement 
Sustainability assessment to be 
performed both ex-ante and ex-post 
Safeguarding principles of 
the UNDP 
JCM Part of the JCM’s concept SD impacts, and EIA are required in 
the design documents for the 
project’s development 
Not mentioned 
JI Requirements set by the host 
party 
Not required for project approval, 
set by the host party 
Not mentioned 
Ontario Recognizes the value of 
ecosystem services and 
environmental co-benefits 
Use of the United Nations SDGs 
framework to identify co-benefits of 
the projects 
Not mentioned 
Quebec No specific sustainability 
objective 
No specific sustainability 
requirement 
Not mentioned 
Spain No specific sustainability 
objective 
No specific sustainability 
requirement 
Not mentioned 
Switzerland No specific sustainability 
objective 
No specific sustainability 
requirement 
A negative list excludes 
potentially harmful project 
types 
US (CAR) Programme manual stablishes 
the avoidance negative social 
and environmental outcomes 
Only for forestry projects “Do not harm” legal 
requirements 
VCS No specific sustainability 
objective 
Reports on environmental impact 
assessment  
Various provisions for 
AFOLU projects. 
Source: authors’ compilation 
3.6. Linkages with other carbon pricing instruments and policies 
This section explores how to generate demand for credits through linkage with other pricing and/or 
command and control instruments, including in developing countries which previously exclusively 
generated supply. 
Cap and trade schemes 
Some emissions trading schemes (ETS) allow for the use of carbon credits in order to provide a “safety 
valve” cost containment tool and to stimulate emissions reductions outside the scope of an ETS. For 
example, the EU ETS was the largest source of demand for Kyoto carbon credits allowing the import 
of around 1.65 billion CERs/ERUs in 2008-2020 (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012a) – or around 60% of 
all Kyoto credits issued by November 2018 (UNEP DTU, 2018a and UNEP DTU, 2018b). Some ETS 
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only allow for the use of domestic credits to stimulate emissions reductions outside the scope of an 
ETS but inside the jurisdiction. For example, California ETS allows for the use of domestic credits with 
a quantitative limit of up to 8% of each entity's compliance obligation. Eligible domestic credits can be 
generated from sectors not covered by the ETS if certified under one of six eligible “protocols”. Other 
examples of ETS that allow for the use of offsets are the NZ ETS and South Korea ETS, with the latter 
allowing CERs but only from activities with “Korean participation”. Some regulations set an absolute 
mandatory cap on GHG emissions in a given sector or sub-sector and allow for the use of carbon 
credits in order to mitigate the potential prohibitive cost of such a regulation. One example of this 
approach is the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) 
developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In order to enable airlines to achieve 
mandatory carbon-neutral growth post-2020, airlines are allowed to use eligible carbon credits, 
including those generated under the UNFCCC, voluntary carbon markets (VCM) and REDD+ (IATA, 
2018). The ICAO is due to start defining CORSIA rules in spring 2019 and it is expected that references 
to Article 6 will be removed given the deferral of Article 6 rules to COP 25 (Carbon Brief, 2018). 
Carbon taxes 
Some carbon taxes allow for full or partial “offsetting” through carbon credits, typically using domestic 
offsets. The latter condition is put in place in order to ensure that emissions reductions are achieved in 
the same jurisdiction as the carbon tax and thus avoid the “outsourcing” of emissions. For example, in 
Colombia entities regulated under the carbon tax can be certified as “carbon neutral” leading to the 
exemption from the tax liability. Entities can achieve “carbon neutrality” through selected carbon credits 
coming from projects registered after 1 January 2010 on the Colombian territory under (IETA, 2018): 
• Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); 
• certification programs or standards that have been either publicly consulted and verified 
appropriately or issued by the UNFCCC; 
• projects recognized by the national government through a National Normalization Body or meet 
the requirements for the registration of initiatives established by the REDD+ registry. 
In Mexico, since 2018, companies can pay the carbon tax in kind with carbon credits from Mexican 
CDM projects issued after January 2014 at market value up to 20% of their carbon tax liability. It means 
that to pay tax for 1 tCO2e, at current CER prices, about 15 CERs would have to be paid. 
Domestic regulatory instruments 
Domestic regulation (technology standards or mandates) can principally become include offsetting. For 
example, the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard simultaneously regulates fuel 
economy and GHG emissions from new vehicles. Manufacturers are permitted to use credits not 
related to improvements in fuel economy to assist in reaching their goals. While to date, carbon credits 
have not been made eligible under CAFE, this would be principally possible without any problem. 
Result-based finance 
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Result-based finance aims at incentivizing targeted outcomes through payments done upon the 
delivery of pre-defined and verified results. Result-based finance can be linked with carbon credits by 
using the existing MRV frameworks, such as that of the CDM. For example, the World Bank’s Carbon 
Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) concluded emission reduction purchase agreements with CDM 
Programme of Activities in low-income countries (World Bank, 2015). Ci-Dev focuses on 
underrepresented sectors, as well as innovative and transformational projects, including rural 
electrification, improved energy efficiency, and waste management (Michaelowa et al. 2016). Another 
example is the World Bank’s Pilot Auction Facility (PAF) launched in 2014 – a results-based payment 
mechanism which sets a floor price for future carbon credits in the form of a tradeable put option, 
competitively allocated via auctions. The PAF targets CDM methane and N2O reduction projects at risk 
of discontinuation. It demonstrated that subsidies offering a guaranteed price for future emission 
reductions through auctions help maximize climate impact per public dollar while incentivizing private 
investment in low-carbon technologies (Bodnar et al. 2017). 
Table 6: Comparison of carbon crediting mechanisms: Linkages to carbon pricing & other 
policies 
Linkages to 
carbon pricing & 
other policies 
Cap and Trade 
schemes (ETS) 
Carbon Taxes Regulation Result-based finance 
ACR Standard is eligible 
under California Cap-
and-trade program 
No No No 
Australia CFI Voluntary market No No Emissions Reduction 
Fund 
BC No No No No 
California OP Link with Quebec No No No 
CDM EU ETS, NZ ETS, 
South Korea ETS, 
ICAO (TBC), voluntary 
market 
Colombia, Mexico No Ci-Dev, Pilot Auction 
Facility 
China Use in pilot ETS 
schemes, planned link 
to national ETS 
No No No 
GIS No No No No 
GS ICAO (TBC), voluntary 
market 
Colombia No No 
JCM No No No No 
JI EU ETS, NZ ETS, 
voluntary market 
No No No 
Ontario No No No No 
Quebec Link with California No No No 
Spain Offsets will come 
primarily from national 
level, although it can 
also buy credits in the 
international carbon 
markets 
 
No No No 
Switzerland No No Swiss CO2 law No 
US (CAR) California, Quebec, 
voluntary market 
No No No 
VCS California, Quebec, 
ICAO (TBC), voluntary 
market 
Colombia No No 
Source: authors’ compilation 
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4. Alternative implementation approaches  
Apart from the key design elements that are already being discussed, there are further and so far 
untested approaches being negotiated in the context of the Paris Rulebook that will become relevant 
in the finalization of the Article 6 negotiations by COP25 in 2019. These alternatives, responding to 
specific new requirements in the context of the PA, are briefly presented in this section. We would like 
to draw attention to the fact that the basis of the negotiations consists of different texts (SBSTA 
2018a,b; COP Presidency 2018b), and that governments may come back on compromises made in 
the early phases of COP 24 negotiations. 
4.1. Governance and accounting  
Composition of the governance body 
Instead of having different institutions for Article 6.2 and 6.4, the pre-COP 24 negotiation text (APA et 
al. 2018) had the option to establish an “Article 6 body” overseeing both mechanisms with specific 
windows for the centralized / decentralized approach. This would strengthen international oversight on 
Article 6.2 and allow for a coherent application of the principles of environmental integrity and 
accounting. The latest generally accepted version of the text (SBSTA 2018a) did no longer contain this 
option. Moreover, APA et al. (2018) contained the so far untested option of mixing state representatives 
and non-state actors in the “Supervisory Body” of the Article 6.4 Mechanism. This option could benefit 
the participation of civil society and thereby enhance the legitimacy of the mechanism. It is however 
not likely to be accepted due to the potential infringement on the Party-led process and not contained 
in SBSTA (2018b). Moreover, historically there have been demands about a “professionalization” of 
the CDM EB, in order to achieve greater independence from governments. However, this is unlikely to 
succeed given the need for country representation in multilateral schemes.  
Public vs private governance 
There seem to be no viable alternatives to public governance of crediting schemes under public 
authority, and private governance of schemes under private authority. However, there is a trend by 
public policy instruments to rely on the “services” of privately governed crediting schemes, e.g. in some 
of the domestic offset programs in North America. This trend could for the first time be adopted by a 
multilateral mechanism if CORSIA accepts units certified by voluntary standards. The role of such 
voluntary standards for achieving NDC goals will also need to be discussed further.  
Supervision of activity cycle 
The CDM has been criticized for the geographical imbalance in the distribution of designated 
operational entities (DOEs) in charge of validation and verification. Institutionalizing the requirement 
for a more diverse geographical distribution of these entities could enhance equity in participation and 
lower the transaction costs especially for low-income countries. 
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Instead of free choice of verifiers which has led to perverse incentives for sloppy verification as well as 
an explosion of fees in times of high demand, a model of allocation of verifiers by the supervisory 
bodies combined with mandatory fee structures could be developed. 
Accounting and registries 
A private registry approach for public crediting mechanisms can be tested, e.g. having the governance 
body specify the registry performance and then tendering out registry operation to private service 
providers.  
It has been proposed to apply blockchain technologies for creating unique transaction histories of 
credits; this is an issue linked to MRV (see section below). 
4.2. Scope and eligibility 
Scope of activities 
It is widely accepted that upscaled crediting approaches for sector- and economy-wide policy 
instruments will be eligible in the long term under the new mechanisms. This would have implications 
on baseline calculations and additionality testing (see section 4.3).  
Temporal scope 
Aligning crediting periods with NDC implementation cycles would be preferable to the fixed periods of 
other mechanisms in order to allow for the ratcheting up of ambitions also in market-based activities. 
Furthermore, as already discussed in the CDM reform process, but so far not implemented with few 
exceptions (e.g. for LEDS lighting in order to get the full crediting period in AMS III AR one needs to 
demonstrate quality standards), technology-specific crediting periods could be introduced. CDM 
crediting periods have been criticized for not taking into account the different time horizons of 
technologies “maturing” and penetrating the market, with some technologies having a shorter time 
horizon than seven or ten years (Carbon Market Watch, 2013). It has been recommended to limit 
crediting periods for activities in sectors that are highly dynamic and complex, while allowing for longer 
crediting periods for project types that require a continuous stream of credit revenues to continue 
operation such as landfill gas utilization/flaring (Öko-Institut, 2016).  
Activity type eligibility 
Regarding the sectoral eligibility for crediting mechanisms, an important debate will be whether 
emission reductions in high carbon infrastructure will continue to be eligible (e.g. efficiency gains in 
coal power plants). Only those activities that are compatible with the long-term objectives of the Paris 
Agreement and commensurate NDC ambition levels should remain eligible for future Art.6 activities. In 
this regard, Parties could decide to introduce the participation criterion to having communicated a LEDS 
and even explaining how the activity contributes to the implementation of this strategy (APA et al. 2018). 
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The result could be the automatic non-eligibility of any coal project, even in LDCs and SIDS because 
contradicting 2°C-consistent pathways. However, the link to long-term strategies has been weekend in 
the last versions of negotiation texts. Information on LEDS must only be submitted if available (SBSTA, 
2018a; COP Presidency, 2018b). 
In the context of ensuring the additionality of activities, it is being discussed to restrict eligible activities 
to sectors or activities being labelled as “conditional” in Parties’ NDCs, assuming that unconditional 
parts would be implemented in any way. In order to prevent perverse incentives to create “hot air” and 
label more activities as conditional, this eligibility criterion could not supplement additionality tests 
(Michaelowa and Butzengeiger, 2017). Furthermore, in the context of the varying types of NDCs it is 
considered to restrict eligible activities to sectors covered in NDCs to allow for robust accounting of 
transfers. In order to set incentives for including sectors in the NDCs, activities could be eligible under 
the condition of the inclusion of the respective sector in the next round of NDCs (Howard, 2018). 
Restricting crediting to activities in sectors covered by the NDC has been a major stumbling block in 
the negotiations that could not be resolved and remains bracketed (COP Presidency, 2018b). Also, 
safeguards to ensure NDC implementation could be introduced. There could be limits on the creation 
and transfer of ITMOs/emission reduction units with regard to a certain share of emission reductions in 
NDC in order to prevent the “overselling” of emission reductions that could pose risks to the NDC 
implementation of the host country. This approach has been taken by some countries under JI, such 
as France that imposed a “90% rule” to all JI projects, whereby only 9 credits were issued for every 10 
tCO2eq reduced (see Section 2.1), but so far has not been institutionalized at a level of a crediting 
mechanism. The discussion of safeguards is contentious and will become difficult to resolve in the run-
up to COP25.  
Crediting of mitigation co-benefits of adaptation actions is pushed in the negotiations by Parties whose 
NDCs focus on adaptation and economic diversification. Operationalizing it would allow for broader 
participation but would also need to ensure stringent additionality testing and development of new 
MRV-approaches (Michaelowa et al., 2018). 
An activity type that has not yet been considered under crediting schemes are negative emissions 
technologies. These are highly important for achieving both the 2°C but even more the 1.5° target but 
have not yet received sufficient attention (Honegger and Reiner, 2018). While methodologies for some 
technologies such as direct air capture could be straightforward to account for, those for other 
processes involving ecosystem functions may be highly complex.  
Recognize special circumstances for LDCs and SIDS  
Less rigid eligibility and accounting criteria could be introduced for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), for instance with regards to baseline setting, additionality 
testing and other preconditions such as inventory reports, LEDS, etc. So far, these special 
circumstances have been institutionalized only on the buyer’s side in the CDM, when the EU ETS 
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allowed for credits from CDM projects registered after 2013 only from LDCs (Shishlov and Bellassen, 
2012a).   
4.3. Environmental integrity  
Baseline setting 
BAU emissions forecasts have often proven considerably off the mark, especially if established for 
longer time periods. They are heavily dependent on external influences hard to foresee such as 
technology innovation, changes in the structure of national economies and sectors or even economic 
crises. A potential solution and alternative to developing policy specific additionality tests could be 
baselines that are updated at a very high frequency during the crediting period (for instance, every two 
years) or “dynamic baseline approaches”, where the baseline calculation is defined ex-ante, but the 
parameters that enter the calculation are only quantified ex-post (Michaelowa and Butzengeiger, 2017).  
Moreover, “ambitious baselines” have been proposed to take the principle of conservativeness further 
in order to explicitly achieve a net mitigation impact, as the assumed baseline is more ambitious than 
the “real” one. In the draft SBSTA texts, baseline guidance on Article 6.2 is bracketed. The included 
text proposes that baselines in Article 6.2 activities must be set in a conservative manner and below 
BAU (SBSTA, 2018a). In the “Katowice text” these principles are un-bracketed and it is specified that 
Parties must demonstrate furthermore that baselines take into account all existing policies and address 
potential leakages (COP Presidency, 2018b). The SBSTA text on Article 6.4 lists different options for 
baseline setting, including historic emissions (in brackets), BAU, conservative baselines including best-
available technology (BAT) approaches, other benchmark approaches and standardized baselines 
(SBSTA, 2018b). This list has been turned into a complex menu of options in the Katowice text, with a 
BAT and/or performance-based approach as default option and “where not considered appropriate” 
the possibility to set baselines based on BAU or historic emissions. It remains however unspecified, 
who will determine the appropriate method for baseline setting according to which criteria (COP 
Presidency, 2018b). Standardized baselines are recognized in both versions of text.  
Avoiding double counting 
Preventing the double counting of emission reductions will become a pressing issue in the new market 
mechanisms of the Paris Agreement, as now all Parties have to implement their NDCs. Seller and 
buyer Party will need to undertake “corresponding adjustments” reflecting the use of transferred credits 
against the fulfillment of their NDCs. The Paris Rulebook on transparency has clearly stated that 
corresponding adjustments for ITMOs under Art. 6.2 apply to emissions levels (COP 2018a, section 
X.A, para 77d). This represents a stringent accounting base, as GHG inventories are compiled on the 
basis of common IPCC rules and methodologies and offer comparability.  
The operationalization of corresponding adjustments has been a key stumbling block of the 
negotiations at COP24. Eventually, negotiations clashed on corresponding adjustment modalities for 
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the international transfers of Article 6.4 units. Accounting of credits under Art. 6.4 may be done 
according to various options, including a “buffer registry” shielded from NDC and GHG inventory, 
starting at zero and reflecting sum of transfers and acquisitions (SBSTA 2018b). Whereas most Parties 
insisted on the need for full accounting of any transfer of mitigation outcomes to avoid double counting, 
Brazil opposed corresponding adjustments for the ‘initial transfer’ of emission reductions as this would 
limit private sector investments. Negotiations under Art. 6 had agreed that all ITMOs measured in any 
other metric than emissions, Parties shall adjust a balance sheet starting from zero and apply this 
balance subsequently to the NDC in the accounting process. It remains however unclear, how the 
comparability of these processes is to be ensured (COP Presidency, 2018b).  
Furthermore, the nature of the post-2020 climate regime will have an impact on the voluntary carbon 
markets that requires a readjustment of the double counting policies of voluntary standards. Without 
formal recognition of the host country followed by a “corresponding adjustment” of the target or 
inventory of the host country for the voluntary action implemented and the credits resulting, any 
voluntary credit issued would contribute to the mitigation goal of the country and thus necessarily result 
in double counting by the private entity and the host country (Hermwille and Kreibich, 2016). Therefore, 
the UNFCCC decision 1/CP21 adopting the Paris Agreement highlights the need of corresponding 
adjustments to prevent double counting, including for approaches involving non-Parties such as 
CORSIA (Gold Standard, 2018c). One option would be to enhance transparency of both compliance 
and voluntary markets and to subject transfers of credits from voluntary standards to the accounting 
guidelines under Article 6. Furthermore, these credits could be credited upon host country approval for 
corresponding adjustment and cancellation by the private actor buyer. Finally, credits on the voluntary 
market could be reframed as “sponsoring” national mitigation policies, no longer representing the 
ownership of a certain amount of emission reduction but a contribution to a governmental policy target 
(ICROA, 2017 and Gold Standard, 2018c). 
Contribution to overall mitigation 
Article 6.4d states that the centralized mechanism shall aim “to deliver an overall mitigation in global 
emissions” (UNFCCC, 2015). This could be operationalized either by automatic cancellation of a certain 
share of units at the moment of issuance or transfer or by discounting rules. Discounted units could 
then not be used against the NDC target of any Party. If implemented, the share of ITMOs/credits 
discounted would have to be determined and potential differentiations and exemptions be introduced 
in light of the specific circumstances of different parties. In the current negotiations, discounting or 
cancellation of credits is a highly contentious topic. Fully bracketed in the SBSTA texts (2018a, b), 
cancellation of units for overall mitigation would be purely voluntary. Delivering overall mitigation is also 
being linked in this version to measures that would increase NDC ambition of host Parties, such as 
conservative baselines, default emission factors or other measures to raise ambition. Host Party 
ambition and overall mitigation, that would not be accounted for by a Party are however, two different 
concepts that are currently being mixed (COP Presidency, 2018b).  
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Accelerated results-based climate finance leading to large credit cancelation could increase overall 
mitigation impacts, even in the absence of a stringent rule-setting in this context. Moreover, shorter 
crediting periods as mentioned above may also have an overall mitigation contribution, in particular if 
crediting supports “phasing-in” more sustainable technologies for a very limited period time, as 
pioneered by the Nitric Acid Climate Action Group8. 
4.4. Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
MRV is expected to build upon the vast experiences of the CDM and JI. Standardization of baselines 
has already begun in the CDM. Further standardization of MRV could be achieved by aiming a more 
comprehensive shifts towards a sectoral aggregation level. This means that MRV could be conducted 
at sectoral rather than activity level. However, this would likely lead to a significantly higher complexity 
and efforts for government actors, who may have capacity constraints. A major deviation from these 
mechanisms would be to allow for the issuance and trading of credits expressed in metrics other than 
tCO2eq, such as, for example, renewable energy certificates. While this could facilitate participation of 
certain Parties having NDCs relying mostly on the scaling up of renewable energy production, allowing 
for the use of different metric would significantly complicate accounting and preserving environmental 
integrity and would therefore be highly problematic.  
4.5. Sustainable Development contributions 
The promotion of SD is likely to play a greater role in the new generation of UNFCCC market-based 
mechanisms but will fall short of becoming mandatory due to the fact that SD is widely regarded as a 
national prerogative. One option is to build on the experiences made with the CDM SD-tool and the 
current initiatives in the voluntary markets (see Section 3.5), ideally leading to the possibility to 
monetize SD benefits, as currently attempted by some initiatives.  
4.6. Linkages with other carbon pricing instruments 
If the Article 6 market-based mechanisms expand their scope to crediting for sector- or economy-wide 
policy instruments, the emission reduction contribution of a domestic ETS – i.e. the difference between 
the baseline and the cap - could be translated into international credits. This could be further enhanced 
by linking emission trading systems and thus generating a regional pool of credits. One concrete 
example would be the Carbon Pricing in the Americas Initiative, assembling federal and state-level 
governments willing to develop domestic carbon pricing instruments, that could potentially be linked 
after the harmonization of MRV requirements in the context of Article 6.2 (CPLC, 2018).  
                                                     
8 http://www.nitricacidaction.org/  
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Additionality for crediting of carbon pricing instruments could be tested on the basis of the price levels, 
assuming lobbying against a carbon price of a certain level and an opposition that is only to overcome 
by recycling revenues (for example, 5€/tCO2eq for developed and 10€ for industrialized countries). The 
linkage of ETS should furthermore be restricted to schemes not affected by over-allocation of credits 
to certain industry branches (Michaelowa and Butzengeiger, 2017). Further applications could be on 
considering crediting for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies or blending crediting with other policy 
instruments such as renewable energy feed-in tariffs or competitive auctions (IISD et al. 2016).  
5. Key commonalities and differences among all schemes 
The table below presents key commonalities and differences as well as alternative implementation 
approaches summarizing the two previous sections. 
Table 7: Overview of key commonalities and differences among crediting schemes 
Design 
elements 
Commonalities Differences Alternatives 
Governance 
and accounting 
- Most schemes have a 
dedicated governance body, 
e.g. the CDM EB, supervising 
the activity cycle 
- Most schemes have a 
dedicated GHG registry 
- Schemes have different levels 
of governance: international, 
national and sub-national 
- Schemes have different 
nature of governance: public 
and private. Mixed 
governance is not found. 
- Common overarching 
governance for centralized 
mechanism and bilateral 
cooperation 
- Mixed governing body with 
public and private actors 
- Tendering of registry 
operations to private actors 
subject to specifications 
Scope and 
eligibility 
- Most schemes allow for both 
projects and PoAs following 
the CDM 
- Most schemes define clear 
crediting periods 
- Most schemes define eligible 
host countries / jurisdictions 
- Most schemes have some 
explicit project type exclusions 
(particularly nuclear) 
- There is an increasing trend 
to ban high-GWP industrial 
gases (HFC, N2O) 
- Existing schemes currently do 
not consider negative 
emissions technologies, such 
as biofuels with CCS  
- Schemes differ in the length 
of crediting periods, which 
may also be differentiated by 
project type (from 5 to 100 
years) 
- Schemes differ in their 
geographical eligibility (from 
global to national) 
- Schemes differ in their 
negative lists (e.g. nuclear, 
forestry, industrial gases, etc.) 
- Upscaled crediting 
approaches for sector- and 
economy-wide policy 
instruments 
- Aligning crediting periods with 
NDC implementation cycles 
- Restricting eligible activities to 
sectors with particular NDC 
characteristics (inside/outside; 
conditional/unconditional) 
- Restrict eligible activities to 
particularly sustainable 
technologies 
- Special access for LDCs and 
SIDS 
- Allowing for crediting of 
mitigation co-benefits of 
adaptation actions 
Environmental 
integrity 
- Most schemes set clear 
requirements in terms of MRV 
- Most schemes require some 
form of additionality 
demonstration  
- Most schemes address the 
double-counting issues 
through unique serial 
numbers of carbon credits 
- Some schemes define 
baselines project-by-project, 
some offer standardized 
baselines, some offer both 
- Approaches to additionality 
demonstration differ: project-
by-project with different levels 
of stringency and positive lists 
- Some schemes offer net 
mitigation through 
conservative baselines and 
limited crediting periods 
- Dynamic baseline approaches 
- Ambitious baseline setting in 
the context of NDCs 
- Requiring LEDS for long-term 
persistence of mitigation 
- Corresponding adjustments, 
also for voluntary standards 
- Discounting/automatic 
cancellation of credits for 
overall mitigation 
MRV - Methodologies are often 
developed in a bottom-up 
manner and accepted by a 
governing body 
- Schemes differ with regards 
to reporting frequency and the 
requirement to make the 
reports public 
- Top-down methodology 
development/standardization 
- Verifier allocation by 
governing entity, common fee 
schedule 
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Design 
elements 
Commonalities Differences Alternatives 
- Monitoring approaches are 
typically defined in a 
methodology 
- Schemes vary in their 
approaches to verification: 
some do not require it, some 
are verified by a public entity, 
some by accredited auditors 
- Allow for alternative metrics in 
ITMOs 
Sustainable 
development 
- Most schemes mention SD in 
their general principles but 
their implementation in 
practice varies greatly 
- Schemes differ in the level of 
emphasis which is put on SD 
in practice: some schemes 
mandate the demonstration of 
SD benefits 
- Some schemes offer concrete 
tools and metrics to measure 
SD contributions 
- Schemes differ in the way 
they provide safeguards 
against negative impacts, 
some do not have safeguards 
- Quantifying SD benefits for 
sale on voluntary markets 
Link with other 
policies 
- Most mechanisms are linked 
in some way with compliance 
or voluntary markets or other 
policies 
- Mechanisms vary in the way 
their carbon credits can be 
used: offsets in ETS, against 
carbon taxes and other 
policies, such as result-based 
finance 
- Linking of domestic carbon 
pricing instruments at the 
regional level through Article 
6.2 
Source: authors’ compilation 
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6. Conclusions and key lessons for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
With the run-up to COP25, 2019 will become a crucial year for the negotiations on Article 6. Highly 
contentious issues surrounding baselines, overall mitigation, corresponding adjustments and taxation 
for adaptation purposes will have to be resolved. Furthermore, several issues that so far have not been 
addressed will need to be negotiated, such as “further safeguards and limits” and the special 
circumstances for LDCs and SIDS. In the quest for landing zones and bridging proposals in 
negotiations, it is important to ensure that the lessons that have been learned in implementing crediting 
schemes around the globe will not be ignored.  
While international compliance crediting schemes such as the CDM have had hard times recently, 
other crediting schemes are spreading around the world at multiple levels, and developing countries 
engage in them not only as sellers but also as buyers. Domestic crediting schemes however, follow a 
“parochial” approach, limiting access mostly to domestic units. The proliferation of different systems 
ensures that carbon pricing policies spread around the world, but the lack of harmonization limits their 
effectiveness. This fragmentation could also lead to a major challenge in ensuring comparable and 
transparent NDC accounting that comprises transferred ITMOs. The review of commonalities and 
differences among crediting schemes and their relevance for Article 6 leads to the following 
conclusions:  
 While governance on Article 6.4 will likely be centralized at the international level, Article 6.2 
governance will be subject to minimal international oversight. Different arrangements from purely 
public to public and private mixed systems are possible and depend on the agreements between 
the participating Parties. Furthermore, under Article 6.2 there will likely be a co-existence of 
national registries and the international registry of the Secretariat.  
 Most crediting schemes explicitly exclude certain technologies. Even if the Article 6 mechanisms 
have so far been designed as technology-neutral, restricting the scope to avoid crediting for 
activities inconsistent with a 1.5°C pathway and prevent “lock-in” effects of high-carbon 
technologies could be an option to enhance the ambition of climate action. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that crediting of activities outside the scope of NDCs, which poses certain risks to accounting 
and environmental integrity, will at least be restricted to certain circumstances and be time-limited.  
 Defining specific crediting periods according to technologies and project types could enhance 
the stringency of the mechanisms, even if this approach has not been implemented yet. 
Furthermore, it is advisable to align crediting periods with NDC implementation and review cycles.  
 The level of ambition of the host country is a crucial safeguard to ensure the environmental 
integrity of the mechanism. If there is “hot air” in the countries’ commitments, i.e. if the NDC targets 
of the participating Parties are above BAU emissions, there is a moral hazard to credit non-
additional or even fictitious emissions reductions as it happened in Ukraine and Russia under JI. 
Conversely, in case of ambitious NDC commitments, host Parties must install safeguards to not 
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jeopardize their own climate action commitments by selling ITMOs. Here, France’s approach to JI 
projects may serve as an example.  
 Some crediting schemes offer net mitigation of emissions through conservative baselines and 
limited crediting periods. In the Paris world, conservative baselines and limited crediting periods 
can be important safeguards to ensure ambition and host Party NDC achievement. The principle 
of overall mitigation of emissions, as to say, mitigation that will not be accounted for neither by 
buyer or seller country can be achieved through the retirement or automatic discounting of credits. 
In the current version of negotiation texts, this option would remain voluntary.  
 While MRV approaches for credits expressed in CO2e are well established, allowing the trading of 
ITMOs expressed in other metrics, as it seems most likely to happen, will further complicate 
international markets and will require substantial follow-up work on the comparability of credits 
and their robust accounting.  
 As we are witnessing with the developments in the CDM and private sector standards, 
sustainable development contributions in crediting schemes are becoming more relevant. This 
trend is currently neglected in the negotiating texts but is likely to gain importance through 
restrictions introduced by credit buyers.  
 Domestic crediting mechanisms are mostly linked with compliance or voluntary markets or other 
policies, such as carbon taxes. Their credits can be used as offsets in ETS or to reduce carbon 
tax liability or in the context of results-based finance. Linking the use of international markets 
to domestic policies would allow to leverage private sector finance and raise ambition through 
the use of Article 6. It furthermore can effectively lower the costs of compliance in domestic carbon 
pricing policies, if properly designed. Safeguarding environmental integrity of the Article 6 
mechanisms will be key to ensure they can be used in these contexts. Attaining an equilibrium 
between supply and demand of credits will be crucial to the stability of the market, as demonstrated 
by the collapse of the Kyoto mechanisms.  
The EU will have an important role to play in particular with regard to creating the enabling environment 
for international mechanisms to succeed. However, it remains unclear whether Europe is willing and 
able to revive its role as an international leader of crediting schemes. After a long period of surplus in 
the EU both within the ETS, in sectors covered by the Effort Sharing Directive (ESD) and for more 
ambitious national government target levels, the likely failure of a number of member states to reach 
2020 targets (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Poland) leads to an implicit demand of 
hundreds of millions t CO2eq (EEA 2018). The ESD allows for several approaches to achieve flexibility 
in achieving national goals. Before 2020, the ESR allows achieving compliance both through domestic 
as well as international credits from the Kyoto Mechanisms. Both strands would now need to be 
mobilized in order to generate sufficient credit supply to comply with existing targets, which could trigger 
an initial revival of the crediting mechanisms.  
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For the post-2020 period, the increasing pressure to ratchet up the mitigation ambition of the EU’s NDC 
– which is still not even in line with the 2°C target yet - could leader Member States to reconsider their 
position to only allow the use of domestic credits. For example, the use of international credits under 
Article 6 for both ETS and ESD sectors could be allowed as part of a substantial increase in the 
mitigation ambition of the EU NDC. In order to achieve this, piloting concrete approaches to Article 6 
implementation by progressive European countries is crucial in order to generate the necessary 
experience that helps to ensure the integrity and legitimacy of crediting mechanisms. This could start 
with bilateral cooperation focusing on the upscaling of PoAs with high SD co-benefits and embedding 
policy crediting in the context of NDC implementation strategies. Another approach could be to develop 
domestic crediting schemes in ESD sectors that build on the experience with JI and GIS. All of these 
approaches, however, should be designed with a view to progressively adopt Article 6 rules as they 
evolve in order to enable transparent NDC accounting and supporting the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement rulebook.   
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